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Abstract
The paper discusses Toulmin's ideas in the philosophy of science - mainly as set out in The Phi/osophy of Science (1953) - in
juxtaposition with Toulmin's reading of Wittgenstein's Tractatus. It claims that three themes present in the Tractatus had an in-
fluence on the core of Toulmin's ideas about scientific explanation: first, Wittgenstein's use of the term "BiId" - interpreted, after
Hertz and Boltzmann, as "a model", also a mathematical one; second, the active, not passive, element in our forming a model
(expressed in Proposition 2.1); and, third, the account of the system of mechanics as a kind of formai net (resp. "models") with
possibly different shapes of "meshes" (the passages from 6.34 on). Thus, Toulmin's thinking of scientific theories as based on
the "modes of representation", or "ways of representing", corresponds well to his understanding of the concept of Bi/d/model in
the Tractatus.
On the influence of Wittgenstein on 20th Century philoso-
phy of science fairly much has been written so far. Typi-
cally, in the expositions of this subject, the following inter-
pretative schema recurs: Tractatus /ogico-phi/osophicus
constituted an important inspiration for logical positivism -
despite Wittgenstein's reservations about the Vienna Circle
philosophy (McGuinness 1979) - whilst Wittgenstein's later
thought, mainly the Phi/osophica/ /nvestigations, contrib-
uted somewhat to anti-positivistic, radical, or even relativis-
tic visions of science (such as those of Kuhn, Hanson and
Feyerabend) or to the so-called "the strong programme" in
the philosophy of knowledge (Bloor, Barnes). In this eon-
text, Stephen E. Toulmin is often regarded - along with
Kuhn, Hanson or Feyerabend - as a protagonist of relativ-
ism (Bocheński 1965; Motycka 1980). In this paper, by dis-
cussing the case of Toulmin, I shall argue for the opposite:
that the essential inspiration for him in advancing his ideas
about physical science came also - irrespective of the al-
leged relative consequences - from his reading of the
Tractatus.
Within the studies on Wittgenstein Toulmin is widely
known, among other things, as a co-author (with Allan S.
Janik) of the book Wittgenstein's Vienna (JanikIToulmin
1996, first published in 1973), placing the philosopher's
thought and life against the cultural, political and intellec-
tual background of Hapsburg Empire, and thus interpreting
Tractarian ideas in close relation with that historical eon-
tex!. He was a student of the author of the Tractatus in
Cambridge in 1941, and later 1946-47, "com ing to his work
primarily from the standpoints of physics, philosophy of
science and philosophical psychology" (JanikIToulmin
1996, 11). Certainly, Wittgenstein was the figure to have
introduced him into philosophy and to have had a great
impact on his future thought; and, in fact, in many of his
books, Toulmin kept declaring his great debt and commit-
ment to this philosopher. What sort was this impact of,
when it comes to his thinking about science, is to be ex-
plored here. As a philosopher of science Toulmin is known,
first of all, from his book Human Understanding (Toulmin
1972), intended as an opus magnum of his whole work on
the development of scientific concepts, where he sets out
in detail the evolutionary account of the history of Natur-
wissenschaften. But of great importance are also his Iwo
earlier and smaller books: Foresight and Understanding
(1968) and The Philosophy of Science (1953). The latter is
to be focused on below.
The structure of the argument in this paper is the foliow-
ing. First, Toulmin's account of Wittgenstein's Tractatus
will be sketched out from the angle of philosophy of sci-
ence. Next, taking Toulmin's book The Philosophy of Sci-
ence (1953) as the subject for the analysis, the relation
between his reading of Tractatus and his own ideas will be
shown. This whole argument is based on Iwo major as-
sumptions that should be indicated and shortly discussed
in advance. The first one concerns the reasons for our
choosing The Philosophy of Science as the basis for an
examination. Despite its being an early Toulmin's work on
the subject (1953), the main ideas of this book are mostly
in accordance with his later complete elaboration of the
theme in Human Understanding (1972). Thus, it may be
treated as a representing the main aspects of Toulmin's
conception - at least those that are relevant to our task.
The second assumption concerns our treating Toulmin's
account of Wittgenstein as set out in Wittgenstein's Vienna
(1972) as applicable to his earlier considerations pre-
sented in the Philosophy of Science (1953). We take that
the core of Toulmin's understanding of the Tractatus - at
least what concerns the question of classical mechanics
and the role of representation in language and science -
was mostly formed as early as in the time of writing this
book. In Wittgenstein's Vienna this was elaborated in an
explicit, deepened form, tied with historical and cultural
context, and supplemented by considerations on the im-
portance of the ethical, for the most part inefficable side of
our lives and cognitive activity (Propositions from 6.41 on,
which we, of course, will not take into account here). Thus
we find this assumption justified.
Toulmin's Wittgenstein
To cut a longer story short, in the aspects that interest us
most, Toulmin's reading of the Tractatus draws on his eon-
viction that Wittgenstein, when constructing its Proposi-
tions, remained not only under the inspiration of Frege and
Russell - whom he explicitly mentions in the Preface - but
also, on a par, was preoccupied by problems posed by
physicists Heinrich Hertz and Ludwig Boltzmann - whom
he refers to later several times. The main problem Hertz
and Boltzmann dealt with was the nature of representation
of the world that science gives us and that makes possible
for us to understand the physical reality. But while these
physicists worked on the representation of the world by
physics, Wittgenstein in the Tractatus aimed at universaliz-
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ing Ihal approach "in such a way that il became applicable
lo all discourse; and he had been able lo execute Ihe very
bild/iche Oarstellung der Welt Ihal, in virtue of its isomor-
phic characler, went far beyond a mere melaphorical de-
scription" (JanikfToulmin, 184). As Ihe framework for Ihis
exlension he found il appropriale lo use Frege and Rus-
sell's propositional calculus.
For Toulmin Ihe key queslion in his approach lo Ihe
Tractatus is lo undersland properly Ihe German word "Bi/e!'
as used in Ihis book, rendered in English as "piciu re" (in
Ihe 50 called "piclure Iheory of meaning"). The lerm "pic-
Iure" applied lo Ihe conceplion of language slrongly sug-
gesls Ihal "proposilions" mirror Ihe "facis" as if Ihey were
sort of pholographs, or menlal images, of Ihem. Such an
inlerprelalion, however erroneous, had been for a long
lime widespread in Ihe Anglo-Saxon philosophical world
and slems from Iheir looking al Willgenslein Ihrough Ma-
chian empiricism and Ihe Vienna Circle logical posilivism,
inslead seeing il essenlially in Hertz's and Bollzmann's
heredily (JanikfToulmin 1996, 145). Whal is wrong in such
an accounl is Ihe passive, reaclive characler of our "pictur-
ing" Ihe world in proposilions. In facl, Toulmin says, Will-
genslein discusses Ihis queslion in aclive and conslruclive
lerms, which is clearly rendered in Proposilion 2.1 of Ihe
Tractatus: "Wir machen uns Bi/der der Tatsachen". This
proposilion Iranslaled inlo English by Pears and McGuin-
ness as: "We picturę facls lo ourselves" (Willgenslein
1963,15) means that a Bi/d/piclure is somelhing which we
produce as an artifacI, "jusl as Ihe painler produces an
'artistic represenlalion' of a scene or person, 50 100 we
ourselves conslrucl, in language, 'proposilions' having Ihe
same forms as Ihe facls Ihey piciure" (JanikfToulmin, 183).
Accordingly, Toulmin insisls, we had beller "Ihink of lin-
guislic Bi/der as 'deliberalely conslrucled verbal represen-
lalions' inslead of (... ) Ihe much looser English lerm 'pic-
tures" (ibidem). In his lasl book, Return ot Reason, when
commenling Ihe Proposilion 2.1, Toulmin finds il legilimale
lo paraphrase il as: "We fashion for ourselves represenla-
lions of states of affairs" (Toulmin 2001, 74).
Apart from Ihe active characler of our Bi/d-forming,
Toulmin puls slress on Ihe conlinuily of Ihe usage of Ihe
lerm "Bi/d" in Hertz and in Willgenslein. Whal is character-
istic of Hertz's notlon of Bi/der is that Ihey are representa-
lions in Ihe sense of logical or malhemalical conslrucls
being formally in accord wilh Ihe world, not - as it was in
Mach's empiricism - in Ihe sense of Ihe mere reproduc-
lions of sensory experience (JanikfToulmin 1996, 183-
184). In view of Ihal, Ihe word "Bi/d", boi h in Hertz and in
Willgenslein, should be underslood as represenlalion
ralher in Ihe sense of "model" Ihan in Ihal of "piciu re". (Ac-
lually, Willgenslein himself says in Proposilion 2.12: "A
piclure is a model of realily") In Ihis conlexl, for example,
Ihe Proposilion 4.014:
A gramophone record, Ihe musical idea, Ihe written
noles, and Ihe sound-waves, all stand lo one anolher in
Ihe same internat relalion of depicling Ihal holds be-
Iween language and Ihe world. They are all conslrucled
according lo a common logical pattern (... ) (Willgen-
stein 1963, 39)
is better inlelligible. The models are lo be underslood as
representations in Ihe sense of Oarstellungen, not Ihe
more subjective Vorstellungen (which, aga in, Mach had in
mind). Therefore, According lo Toulmin's reading, il is jusl
"models" Ihal are able lo represent Ihe "facts", possibly
being also malhemalical.nolnecessary piclographic ones.
The Bi/derlmodels provide us wilh Ihe logical slruclure of
language Ihal allows us lo know in advance Ihe possibilily,
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or impossibilily, of certain configuralions of objecis. In Ihe
Tractatus , Ihey presenl silualions "in logical space, Ihe
exislence and non-exislence of slales-of-affairs" (2.11),
which assert, or deny, some logical conneclions belween
symbols, and Ihus belween some objecis in Ihe world. In
olher words, Ihe models constitute Ihe a priori structure of
Ihe language, in which certain proposilions can have a
sense, and som e other cannol have (Toulmin, Janik 1996,
185-186). Our aclual asserting a particular Irue proposilion
musi proceed wilhin Ihe a priori logical space, being de-
lermined by Ihe Bi/der, or models, of realily. Of course, in
Ihe Traciarian vision of language, Ihere exisls an "isornor-
phism" belween Ihe formai scaffolding of Ihe language and
Ihe slruclure of Ihe realily ilself. In science, we also deal
wilh formal, a priori models lo be pul inlo relalion wilh ex-
perience - for example such deduclive syslems as Newto-
nian dynamics. They, in Ihemselves, conslilule logical
space which a concrele physical or chemical proposilion
musi be placed in. As Proposilion 6.341, referring direclly
lo Hertz's The Princip/e ot Mechanics, says:
Newtonian mechanics, for example, imposes a unified
form on Ihe descriplion of Ihe world. Lei us imagine a
while surface wilh irregular black spols on it. We Ihen
say Ihal whalever kind of piclure Ihese make, I can al-
ways approximale as closely as I wish lo Ihe descrip-
lion of il by covering Ihe surface wilh a sufficienlly fine
square mesh, and Ihen saying of every square whelher
il is black or while. In Ihis way I shall have imposed a
unified form on Ihe descriplion of Ihe surface. The form
is oplional, since I could have achieved Ihe same resull
by using a nel wilh a Iriangular or hexagonal mesh.
Possibly Ihe use of a Iriangular mesh would have made
Ihe descriplion simpler: Ihal is lo say, il mighl be Ihal
we could describe Ihe surface more accuralely wilh a
coarse Iriangular mesh Ihan wilh a fine square mes h (or
conversely), and 50 on. The differenl nels correspond
lo differenl syslems for describing Ihe world. Mechanics
delermines one form of descriplion of Ihe world by say-
ing Ihal all proposilions used in Ihe descriplion of Ihe
world musi be oblained in a given way from a given sel
of proposilions-Ihe axioms of mechanics (... )
(Willgenslein 1963, 137-139).
Whal is importani here wilh such models or representa-
lions, that it seems lo be possible for us lo employ differenl
"nets" - simpler or more complex - lo describe Ihe world,
depending on Ihe aspecls Ihey are able lo caplure.
Wittgenstein in Toulmin
In The Phi/osophy ot Science (1953) Toulmin seems lo
develop his vision of physical sciences on Ihe base of Ihe
above Traciarian Ihemes. The recurring problem in Ihis
book is Ihe difference belween nalural hislory - which can
find ils Iheorelical support in quasi-Machian empiricism -
and physics - that represenls Ihe world in Ihe way Hertz,
Boiizmann and Willgenslein spoke aboul, i.e. by advanc-
ing some models of realily and by further working on Ihem.
According lo Toulmin, Ihe core of physical discovery is our
inlroducing anovel "way of representation", or "mode of
represenlalion", that allows us lo see Ihe old phenomena
in a new way (Toulmin 1953, 17 and further). This mode of
represenlation conslilules a sort of formal, a priori frame-
work wilhin which one is able lo slale physical facls, lo
advance particular empirical hypolheses, laws and Iheo-
ries. Whal is characlerislic of Ihe ways of represenling is
Ihal Ihey are not direclly deducible from experience, in-
stead, Ihey are aclively molded human conslruclions (ana-
logical lo Ihe Hertzian models/Bi/der Wittgenslein look up
in Tractatus, 2.1). The represenlation may have a piclorial
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form - as it is, for example, in geometrical optics that treats
light-ray as a straight line - but it does not have to. It may
also be a mathematical model. The essential thing is that it
allows us to employ som e new inferring techniques in our
examination of the phenomena (Toulmin 1953, chapter 2).
This corresponds to Toulmin's understanding the concept
Bild in the Tractatus.
Apart from that, the fragments concerning Newtonian
mechanics from 6.3 on (to which Toulmin refers in his
book, in the supplementary section "Suggested reading"),
especially those from 6.34 to 6.3611, have their noticeable
counterparts in Toulmin's book. Where Wittgenstein talks
about various formai "nets" (with differently shaped
"meshes") to be possibly used to describe the world, there
Toulmin considers theories built on different modes of rep-
resentation - such as, in the field of optics, geometrical
optics with the principle of rectilinear propagation of light,
wave-theory or corpuscular theory of light. Ali of them are
applicable within a certain scope of phenomena, although
we cannot say of any that they are simply true. In fact, they
all constitute some specific ways of our seeing the phe-
nomena. This, of course, leaves another question open:
when and on what grounds can we employ a particular,
chosen theory? And a more general one: how does it
come about that one "mode of representation" gains more
approval among the scientific community than another,
and thus becomes a promising starting point for further
investigations? Toulmin tries to answer to them both in The
Philosophy of Science and, furthermore, in his later books.
But these are no longer Tractarian themes.
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